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The Inadvertent Alliance of Anthony 
Comstock and Margaret Sanger: 
Abortion, Freedom, and Class in 
Modern America
Karen Weingarten
This article investigates how moral-reformer Anthony Comstock, who helped outlaw 
the practice of birth control and to have abortion criminalized, and Margaret Sanger, 
founder of Planned Parenthood and birth-control activist, advanced their causes 
through the discourse of freedom and self-control. While Comstock’s and Sanger’s 
works are often seen in opposition, this article questions that positioning by pointing 
out how they both lobbied against accessible abortion using similar tactics. Finally, 
this article demonstrates how Comstock and Sanger, through different means, worked 
to present abortion as a depraved practice that would lead to the demise of American 
society. Presenting Comstock and Sanger side by side, this article shows one example 
of the reasons why it is problematic to use the language of rights and freedom to argue 
for fair and equal access to abortion.
Keywords: abortion / Anthony Comstock / birth control / eugenics / Margaret 
Sanger / self-control and freedom
There’s more than one kind of freedom. Freedom to and 
freedom from. In the days of anarchy, it was freedom to. Now 
you are being given freedom from. Don’t underestimate it.
—Aunt Lydia from Margaret Atwood’s, The Handmaid’s Tale 
([1985]1998, 34)
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This article seeks to trace a continuum between Anthony Comstock’s moral-
izing jeremiads against “obscene acts” and Margaret Sanger’s quest to legalize 
birth control, by demonstrating the ways in which both used disciplining tac-
tics that condemned abortion. Most important, this article demonstrates how 
Comstock and Sanger succeeded in criminalizing abortion, thus completing 
the task begun by the American Medical Association, which by the 1880s had 
managed to outlaw abortion in every U.S. state. (For more on this history, see 
Janet Brodie’s Contraception and Abortion in Nineteenth-Century America [1994], 
James Mohr’s Abortion in America [1978], and Leslie J. Regan’s When Abortion 
Was a Crime [1997].)
Comstock’s contribution to this juridical process worked by lumping abor-
tion with other “sexual crimes” and contributing to the misconception that 
abortion was primarily used by working-class and poor women. Similarly, Sanger 
promoted birth control by separating it from the issue of abortion; by emphasiz-
ing abortion’s pernicious effects, she often portrayed birth control as a means to 
better the human race, thus paralleling Comstock’s construction of abortion as 
degrading and destructive. While Sanger and Comstock initially appear to be 
working through different paradigms, the opposition between them is belied 
by the investment that both activists made in similar constructions of freedom 
and protection that subtend liberal and conservative ideologies.1 Comstock’s 
opposition to abortion mirrors Sanger’s position, because both are invested in 
constructing laws that interpellate subjects into individualizing and moralizing 
persons who, if properly trained, should be capable of self-control. It is through 
laws concerned with rights that the emphasis on the individuated life becomes 
foregrounded; indeed, it is precisely through the emergence of rights-based laws 
that the concept of an entitled subject capable of self-regulation emerged, as 
well as the inverse concept of a subject incapable of self-control and therefore 
legally stripped of “choice.”
Using rights-based discourse, or what is sometimes called “the right to 
choose,” as a means to re-enfranchise historically oppressed communities has 
a prominent though conflicted history in the United States. From Patricia 
Williams’s (1992) work that asserts that rights granted through constitutional 
law are crucial in the fight to grant African Americans equal status in the 
United States to Wendy Brown’s (1995) critiques of rights as embedded in a 
liberalism that establishes identity-based politics, the discussion of rights as a 
tool for remedying civil and social inequality has been heated. Much has also 
been written about the role of rights in granting women access to abortion and 
control over their bodies. One of the most well-regarded and thorough texts 
critiquing the rhetoric of choice in abortion politics is Ricki Solinger’s Beggars 
and Choosers (2001). Solinger calls choice a watered-down version of rights, 
and strongly advocates for a more rights-based abortion politics. On the other 
hand, Mary Poovey (1992) has argued that giving women the right to have an 
abortion maintains an individualistic attitude toward a procedure that should 
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be based in community decision and with a community’s support. In rehears-
ing rights rhetoric from the U.S. civil rights movement, Kimberle Crenshaw 
(2000) provides a nuanced picture of the critique of rights that emerged from the 
movement, but also the necessity for those rights.2 Crenshaw recites the “Crits” 
argument, which argues that rights discourse is often legitimated through a 
“victims” perspective; it focuses not on the reasons why crimes or oppressions 
are perpetuated, but rather on the ways in which victims’ experiences are 
shaped. Indeed, the argument can be taken a step further: Rights then function 
as protection and therefore approach every subject as a potential victim that 
needs the shield of the law.
Thus, we end up with a rights-based system that sounds strikingly like 
Aunt Lydia’s description in The Handmaid’s Tale (Atwood [1985]1998). In Roe v. 
Wade, while the Supreme Court decided that women had the freedom to make 
their own reproductive choices, because the state granted individual privacy, 
the court also granted women freedom from the potentially undue burden of 
pregnancy.3 The slipperiness between freedom from and freedom to points to a 
tension in the foundations of U.S. liberalism. Freedom from assumes what Cren-
shaw points to as a victims-based protectionist ideology: The Supreme Court 
is “protecting” women who, without laws protecting abortion rights, would fall 
prey to the potentially difficult conditions of an unwanted pregnancy, even as 
the same law mandates that the individual woman has a right to control her 
own body.4 Freedom to assumes an individuated private body that should not 
be subject to government interference. While Sanger and Comstock were both 
invested in outlawing abortion, the rhetoric they established for anti-abortion 
arguments mirrors a rights-based pro-abortion law and thus points to how 
pro-abortion policy in the United States has been so deftly undermined in the 
years following Roe v. Wade.
The House Built on Sand
While much has been documented about Sanger’s investment in eugenics and 
birth control, relatively little has been written about her fluctuating stance on 
abortion. Sanger’s more ambivalent positions are often elided; relatively little 
attention has been paid to the element of her rhetoric that is compatible with 
neither contemporary mainstream feminist arguments nor anti-racist national-
isms.5 Perhaps this has occurred because of polarization over her other views. 
Her work either elicits stringent criticism for its racism or effusive praise for its 
efforts in legalizing contraception. Some of Sanger’s strongest anti-abortion 
claims were published in The Birth Control Review (BCR), which began its run 
in February 1917 as a simply formatted periodical to be used as a political tactic 
in the quest to legalize birth control. In its first few issues, the journal mainly 
published polemical essays by known birth-control activists like Havelock Ellis 
and Elizabeth Stuyvesant, as well as desperate letters from women seeking 
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birth-control help (only as a means to demonstrate the dire situation), but at 
the start of its second year, it broadened its publication scope to include short 
stories and poetry, and eventually added disturbing photo essays depicting 
dysgenic “types” overrun with children.
From the start, the journal was clearly invested in promoting the politics 
of eugenics; almost every issue mentions eugenics or has an article featuring 
the topic. Anna Blount (1918), a frequent contributor to the journal, captures 
its eugenic philosophy best when she writes: “God speed the day when the 
unwilling mother, with her weak, puny body, her sad, anaemic, unlovely face, 
and her despondent whine, will be no more. In that day we shall see a race of 
American thoroughbreds, if not the superman” (3). Essays like Blount’s made 
explicit that BCR was invested in a eugenics-like policy that would “improve” 
the conditions of all Americans, and eventually eliminate “undesirable” citizens 
through preventing or reducing their ability to reproduce. However, Sanger 
also distanced herself from eugenicists who argued that woman’s first duty is to 
reproduce for the state. In February 1919, in an article titled “Birth Control and 
Racial Betterment,” she strongly states that if eugenics is to succeed, it must rely 
on birth control and change its position on voluntary motherhood. She writes 
that birth-control activists contend that woman’s first duty is not to the state, 
as eugenicists believed, but “that her duty to herself is her first duty to the state” 
(11). Sanger continues to insist that birth control is the necessary foundation 
for eugenics, and in an elaborate gesture, she ends with a compelling metaphor, 
arguing: “Eugenics without Birth Control seems to us a house builded upon 
sands. It is at the mercy of the rising stream of the unfit. It cannot stand against 
the furious winds of economic pressure” (12). As her metaphor suggests, one of 
BCR’s most strident goals was to irrevocably link the issues of birth control and 
eugenics through its emphasis on a freedom from politics. Here, Sanger stresses 
that eugenics, and hence the betterment of U.S. citizenry, is doomed to fail 
unless there is a freedom from uncontrolled reproduction. And yet elsewhere, 
Sanger also insists on the necessity that women have freedom to control their 
reproductive capacities so that they can have freedom from abortion.
Sanger’s most explicit anti-abortion stance came in an article she wrote 
early in the journal’s run that is starkly titled “Birth Control or Abortion—
Which Shall It Be?” (1918). She opens the article by associating abortion with 
working-class women, arguing that wealthy and middle-class women have 
discovered how to limit family size and to be voluntary mothers, while more 
working-class women are denied “the knowledge of the safe, harmless, scientific 
methods of Birth Control” and thus limit their families “by means of abortion” 
(3). Sanger’s disciplining tone—her juxtaposition of birth control as rational 
and safe, with abortion as dangerous and volatile—is the main focus of the 
article. She proceeds with a scientific explanation of conception, clinically 
describing how pregnancy occurs and then explicitly states: “When scientific 
means are used to prevent this meeting, and thereby to limit families, one is 
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said to practice Birth Control” (3). She cites a doctor to prove that abortion 
risks women’s health, potentially causing “hemorrhage, retention of an adher-
ent placenta, sepsis, tetanus, perforation of the uterus .  .  . sterility, anemia, 
malignant diseases, displacements, neurosis, and endometritis” (4).
And if this long list did not scare readers enough, Sanger also adds that 
the “hundreds of thousands of abortions performed in America each year are 
a disgrace to civilization” (4). Birth control, she argues, means “health and 
happiness—a stronger, better race,” while abortion “means disease, suffering, 
death” (4). She ends by rhetorically asking “Birth control or abortion—which 
shall it be?” (4; emphasis in original), making clear that the division between 
the two is definitive and complete. Her logic, ultimately, depends on maintain-
ing populations demarcated by class positions that are so well controlled they 
discipline themselves.
In 1920, Sanger republished an expanded version of this BRC essay in her 
Woman and the New Race, re-titling it as “Contraceptives or Abortion?” In this 
piece, she further elaborates her belief that women with disposable incomes were 
already practicing birth control, while working-class women could only resort 
to abortion if unwanted pregnancy occurred. She again stresses that abortion 
is “abnormal” and “dangerous” (122), but adds in this version that “[t]he woman 
who goes to the abortionist’s table is not a criminal but a martyr—a martyr to 
the bitter, unthinkable conditions brought about by the blindness of society at 
large” (129), because she has to sacrifice “what is highest and holiest in her—her 
aspirations to freedom, and her desire to protect the children already hers” (129).
In both versions of her essay, Sanger assumes that if working-class women 
had access to birth control, as did wealthy and middle-class women, then they 
would have the freedom to act responsibly and to prevent the demise of civili-
zation by ceasing to reproduce what she views as defective children. However, 
in the later version, she also constructs a politics of victimization that turns 
working-class women into martyrs who expose themselves to the evils of abor-
tion, because the law gives them no choice. Sanger supposes that if given access 
to birth control, women would no longer seek abortion, and she uses wealthy 
and middle-class women as examples of this argument, even though Mohr 
(1978) documents that it was primarily white middle-class women who sought 
abortion during its era of illegality. If the historical data are correct, Sanger’s 
description of the working-class woman as martyr could only have been con-
structed to produce a disciplining and patronizing effect: If these women want 
to actualize the middle-class values of self-control and freedom, which Sanger 
explicitly alludes to in the previous quotation, they must distinguish between 
birth control and abortion. Her writing, although it seems to be addressing the 
conditions of a working-class population, actually functions as a disciplining 
tactic for middle-class women, as a means to differentiate them from the victims 
of abortion. In other words, her logic implies that working-class women need 
freedom from abortion, because they need the protection of law—supposedly to 
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protect them from the harm of abortion—while to be a wealthier woman means 
to know how to access the freedom to reproduce according to one’s own self-will.
In her autobiography (1938), Sanger describes two trips she took, one to 
Germany in 1920 and the other to Russia thirteen years later, to promote birth 
control and learn about new contraceptive methods that she might export 
back to the United States. In both countries, she discovered that abortion 
rather than birth control is the primary means to prevent unwanted children. 
When she questioned a German doctor about his choice to perform abortion 
rather than offer women contraceptives, he replied: “We will never give over 
the control of our numbers to the women themselves. What, let them control 
the future of the human race? With abortions it is in our hands; we make the 
decisions, and they must come to us” (286). To Sanger’s horror, she found that 
most German doctors she met had a similar response. Her dismayed reaction 
to German birth-control policy was not only rooted in their use of abortion 
instead of contraception, but also in the lack of control women had over their 
reproductive lives. The doctor clearly told Sanger that reproduction was too 
important to allow women to make their own choices, and therefore it had to 
be regulated by male doctors and the state—which denied women any option 
but abortion. Her conversation with the German doctor served as evidence 
for her that while birth control provides women with the freedom to control 
their reproduction, abortion strips them of that right. Her later visit to Russia 
revealed a similar opinion about abortion, but also demonstrated Sanger’s more 
complicated eugenics-based position.
In Russia, as in Germany, Sanger documented a concern with population 
decline and a concerted government effort to encourage people to reproduce 
more. Sanger met with Dr. Kaminsky, secretary of the Commissariat of Public 
Health, and questioned him about whether Russia had a policy to “control 
families.” She added: “I know you have much freedom for women and a fine tech-
nique for abortions. . . . Four hundred thousand abortions a year indicate women 
do not want to have so many children” (449). Kaminsky evasively responded 
to Sanger by not addressing Russia’s abortion policy, but simply insisted that 
Russia desired an increase of population in both skilled and unskilled workers. 
In fact, Kaminsky’s emphasis on Russia’s desire to increase its labor pool sug-
gested that he was informing Sanger that his country refused to engage in a 
birth-control policy based on eugenics. Thus, in assessing Russia’s population 
growth, Sanger wrote:
I considered Russia’s situation very serious. . . . Unless she looked ahead and 
educated her people in the problems which arose out of population, within 
two generations she would find herself with the same differential birth rate 
then existing in England and the United States. It would, however, have 
much more tragic consequences since it would lower the augmentation of 
the capable, skilled, shock troops of industry, the idealists and active, selfless 
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workers, and would multiply from the bottom unskilled, ignorant, dull-witted 
workers, the superstitious element which even the greatest efforts of a Soviet 
dictatorship running at top speed could not pull up and out of their evolutional 
environment. (451)
Here, Sanger revealed her belief that a country with only an abortion 
policy cannot properly practice eugenics and will thus be left with a degenerate 
population. In her analysis of the situation in Germany and Russia, her anti-
abortion position rested on desiring more control for women so that they had 
the freedom to prevent pregnancy. At the same time, she maintained that as 
long as abortion was legal or accessible, then women would not learn to be self-
controlled and unwanted pregnancies would continue to occur. She concluded 
that this practice would eventually lead to the demise of the population. Implicit 
in her analysis is that as long as abortion was the only means to limit family 
size, people would remain uneducated and unregulated as the “dull-witted” 
workers reproduced, while perhaps occasionally seeking abortion—a practice 
Sanger called “a cruel method of dealing with the problem because abortion, 
no matter how well done, is a terrific nervous strain and an exhausting physical 
hardship” (449).
Ellen Chesler (1992) argues that Sanger dissociated abortion from con-
traception to make her arguments for legalizing birth control more palatable 
to contemporary legislators, and that Sanger took this position because “[i]n 
respectable circles, illegal abortion was universally condemned as primitive, 
dangerous, and disreputable” (271). Following a similar line of argument, Joan 
Jensen (1981) traces the evolution of Sanger’s position in Family Limitation, a 
pamphlet of Sanger’s that provided information for women about contracep-
tion, sex, and, in the early days of its publication, abortion. Initially printed in 
1914, the pamphlet went through several revisions, including one in 1921 that 
expurgated information about abortion techniques. From its first to ninth edi-
tions, Sanger advised women in the early stages of an unwanted pregnancy to 
take quinine to “restore the menses.” However, she warned that this procedure 
might not work past the first month of gestation, and that women further along 
should consult a doctor (Sanger 2003, 88–89, 359).
By its tenth edition, Sanger had omitted this advice. Jensen contends that 
this shift in position is reflective of Sanger’s move to more right-wing politics, 
away from her earlier socialist-inflected stance. As institutionalized support for 
birth control from radical organizations waned, Sanger strategically approached 
middle-class suffrage organizations and other liberal feminists for financial 
and political support. Additionally, Family Limitation faced threats from postal 
censors, who under the 1873 Comstock Act deemed the material obscene and 
inappropriate for public circulation. Jensen argues that the combination of 
political changes and personal hardship pushed Sanger to revise the tenth edi-
tion of the pamphlet so that no references to abortion, either direct or oblique, 
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were included.6 Jensen views these edits as purely pragmatic: Sanger needed a 
new source of funding, and she found one most readily in a more conservative 
middle class.
Was Sanger’s view rooted in sheer pragmatism as Chesler and Jensen sug-
gest? A closer look at Sanger’s writings on abortion, including her personal 
letters to friends and political associates, reveal a more complicated position. 
These writings evince that her stance on abortion changed as she became 
more concerned with medical issues, health, and what was then popularly 
called “dysgenics”—the passing on of negative traits to progeny. In a letter 
to her friend and activist ally Marie Stopes, one of the leading birth-control 
activists in early twentieth-century England, Sanger revealed her ambivalent 
feelings about abortion. She confided that she understood that women resorted 
to seeking abortion out of desperation, but she also stressed her firm belief that 
once contraception was legal and accessible, the necessity for abortion would 
be eliminated (Sanger 2003, 164–66). Thus she justified her condemnation of 
abortion as a practice that would soon become null if her efforts succeeded.7
By the time she started publishing BCR, Sanger was intent on putting 
forth her anti-abortion position, and her tactics were so forceful that it is dif-
ficult to consider them merely an attempt to please an anti-abortion public. In 
November 1917, she wrote a letter to the editor of Medical World expressing her 
dismay that the American Medical Association approved of laws that allowed 
women access to abortion if continuation of pregnancy would severely impact 
their health. Sanger angrily wrote that “abortion laws were broad enough to 
allow in such cases a ‘duly licensed physician’ to perform an abortion in order 
to save the life of either the women or the child. It all seemed such a chaotic 
state to me—that it was perfectly legal to go thru the sufferings of an abortion, 
but illegal to prevent conception” (Sanger 2003, 199).8
This was a position she would put forth in many of her arguments against 
abortion in BCR. Furthermore, she widely publicized stories about the “dan-
gers” of abortifacients; she believed that if a woman did not successfully abort 
her pregnancy using these drugs, the fetus would be negatively impacted and 
the woman had a high chance of giving birth to an infant with defects (see 
Sanger’s Women and the New Race 1920, 126–27). She continually stressed 
that her opposition to abortion was based on health factors, citing statistics 
(miscalculated in the above quotation according to the editors of The Selected 
Papers of Margaret Sanger [Sanger 2003]) about the number of women who died 
during or after the procedure (Sanger 2003, 381). Thus, she emphasized that if 
she sought to outlaw abortion, it was only for women’s own protection, because 
she aimed to grant them the freedom from the dangerous effects of abortion.
In reading Sanger’s work, Lealle Ruhl (2002) points out that Sanger’s fight 
to legalize birth control rests on two separate platforms. On the one hand, she 
argued that until birth control was accessible, women could not be free and 
equal citizens; birth control was a feminist issue. Yet, on the other, she also 
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stressed that birth control was necessary to prevent overpopulation, especially 
since “dysgenic types” tended to produce the most children. Ruhl notes the 
slipperiness between these two positions: one demands that women have the 
freedom to control their bodies, whereas the other argues for the medical man-
agement of “unfit” women and their reproductive functions. Subtending these 
positions, Ruhl sees Sanger as putting forth an argument about responsibility, 
stating that women “need to uphold their end of the bargain of reproduc-
tive freedom: Contraception in exchange for a guarantee to act ‘responsibly’ 
where reproductive decisions are concerned. . . . To act responsibly means to 
conform to an essentially middle-class, educated, and scientifically oriented 
worldview” (656).
Sanger’s contradictory programs point to the slipperiness of the language 
of rights, choice, and control. Rights and choice are granted to individuals when 
they can prove themselves to be responsible citizens, abiding by certain norma-
tive conditions. And as demonstrated most clearly by current federal abortion 
laws that set age limits on who can responsibly seek an abortion without guard-
ian permission and that force women to view fetal ultrasounds so that decisions 
can be responsibly made, the discourse of self-control itself disciplines subjects 
into normative categories. In Sanger’s writings, abortion comes to represent 
irresponsible and reckless behavior, meant to highlight how the use of contra-
ception can construct a self-controlled woman, one who can responsibly choose 
when pregnancy occurs. Sanger was invested in constructing a birth-control 
discourse that both managed and disciplined bodies. Furthermore, she appealed 
to class status in her constructions of familial and reproductive norms: Subjects 
should be properly interpellated, and if they refused to be, they were abnormal 
and needed to be managed or else they posed a threat to the supposedly well-
managed, properly demarcated American.
Exposing Frauds Through Family Values
Anthony Comstock is perhaps best-known for his anti-prostitution and anti-
obscenity reforms. In 1872, the U.S. Congress, after pressure from his organi-
zation, the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice (NYSSV), and the 
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), passed what are now known as 
the Comstock laws, banning all forms of “erotic” material, from the distribution 
of pornography to the availability of contraception.9 Even information about 
how to limit family size was deemed obscene under these laws, and Comstock 
himself volunteered to sort through the mail at the post office to seize any 
material that was suspect. Although Comstock never attacked access to abor-
tion specifically, he classified abortion with all the other immoral acts and ideas 
that he saw corrupting American society. The language of his act concerning 
abortion reads:
Karen Weingarten · 51
Every obscene, lewd, or lascivious, and every filthy book, pamphlet, picture, 
paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character, and 
every article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for preventing concep-
tion or producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral use; and every 
article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing which is advertised 
or described in a manner calculated to lead another to use or apply it for 
preventing conception or producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral 
purpose; and every description calculated to induce or incite a person to so use 
or apply any such article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing—Is 
declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or 
delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier. (18 USC Section 1461)
Comstock, even more than Sanger, was explicitly engaged in a discourse of 
protection and a concern for freedom from harmful materials and practices. By 
deeming any abortion-related instruments and information “nonmailable,” the 
law allowed for a breach of privacy, because a postal agent could open any suspect 
package or letter. Yet, this violation of privacy was justified because it provided a 
freedom from “indecent” materials that could infiltrate innocent lives.
Comstock’s response to the case of Cora Sammis in his book Frauds 
Exposed; Or, How the People Are Deceived and Robbed, and Youth Corrupted 
([1880]1969) illustrates this point more precisely. Here, Comstock writes about 
Sammis, a twenty-two-year-old woman from a middle-class home who sought 
an abortion after she became pregnant. Although she was engaged, both she 
and her fiancé agreed to seek an abortion before the marriage. Unfortunately, 
Sammis died shortly after the procedure, and her abortionist was arrested and 
imprisoned. In response to the case, Comstock lamented “the anguish of the 
parent who wakes up to the knowledge that the beloved child is debauched” 
(43). Interestingly, Comstock decried Sammis’s abortion more than her death, 
and contended that her parents’ pain must come from knowing that their daugh-
ter was led astray even more than from the loss of their child. In great detail, 
he imagined how Sammis’s father must have felt as he received news that his 
daughter had died of an abortion, and he urged his reader to aid in abolishing 
this daughter-destroying practice. Sammis is portrayed as an innocent victim, 
one who fell into the hands of the wrong people and was thus defiled. Employing 
this logic, he urged his readers to agree that young women like Sammis must 
be protected and freed from the harmful agents that circulated unfettered in 
American society.
Comstock’s encounter with the infamous New York abortionist Madame 
Restell is another example of his relentless anti-abortion pursuits. Restell’s 
given name was Anne Lohman (sometimes also printed as Caroline Lohman). 
An immigrant from England, Madame Restell sold pills that claimed to abort 
fetuses. Her business was so successful, she moved to Fifth Avenue in New York 
City and worked among the most elite New Yorkers, many of whom were her 
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clients. Comstock initially pursued Restell on a dare that he could not succeed 
in finding grounds for her arrest, despite the fact that the nature of her practice 
was an open secret. In 1886, Comstock went to Restell’s home disguised as a man 
seeking to help his pregnant lover obtain an abortion. When Restell agreed to 
sell him an abortifacient, he arrested and charged her with distributing illegal 
and obscene material. Before Restell’s case came to trial she committed suicide, 
which stirred much controversy in the New York media. As sociologist Nicola 
Beisel (1997) documents, most of the circulating newspapers condemned Restell, 
although the World also denounced Comstock for luring the woman to sell 
him an illegal product. In the words of the newspaper, “[n]o matter what the 
wretched woman was who took her life with her own hand yesterday, her death 
has not freed the world from the last of detestable characters. Whatever she was 
she had her rights” (47; emphasis added). The World’s representation of the case 
again points to an important tension in discourses of freedom. Although the 
editorial asserted that Restell had rights, which Comstock violated when he 
tricked her, it also contributed to Comstock’s conviction that to rid the world 
of debased people like Restell was to free us from their dangerous influences.
Historian Janet Brodie (1994) notes that Comstock frequently passed moral 
judgment on women he deemed immodest. As she explains it, Comstock viewed 
women who put effort into their appearance as seeming “too independent, not 
‘belonging’ to any man” (273). Brodie traces Comstock’s involvement in curtail-
ing contraception access to his conflict with Victoria Woodhull, the nineteenth-
century feminist and “free love” activist, who was also the first woman to run 
for President and become a stockbroker on Wall Street. According to Brodie, 
Comstock felt threatened by Woodhull, because she was precisely the type of 
woman who refused to belong to any man and insisted on pursuing ambitions 
that were usually reserved only for men. Comstock had Woodhull arrested on 
charges of libel, only to face humiliation when the judge dismissed the case. 
Brodie notes that the case reflected so poorly on Comstock that both the 
YMCA and his sympathetic biographer made no note of the incident in their 
records. Soon after this setback, he began his aggressive campaign to outlaw 
access to abortion and contraception. Brodie argues that the proximity of these 
two events suggests that Comstock, after his failure in prosecuting Woodhull, 
became driven to root out the causes that he saw “ruining” women. Implicit 
in this new quest was Comstock’s concern with containing female bodies that 
could potentially exceed what he viewed as the norm for family, reproduction, 
and sexuality.
Comstock’s construction of these norms was tied to ensuring the hegemony 
of the middle-class family—a construction that in the late nineteenth century 
was built on the subservient positions of women and children. His commit-
ment to “respectability” was tied to a classed notion of family. For example, 
in his description of Cora Sammis, he bemoaned the loss of a daughter in “a 
respectable” family—one that went to church and lived in a “quiet village on 
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the eastern end of Long Island” (Brodie 1994, 417). In other words, this family 
had all appearances of existing apart from the moral debauchery to which 
Comstock dedicated his life to eradicating. In this example, as in others, Com-
stock revealed that he is most intent on protecting the Christian, middle-class 
family from the seedy elements infiltrating society. Thus, his polemic against 
open displays of sexuality in general became a technology for regulating and 
controlling the bodies that posed the greatest danger to hegemonic norms.
Worse yet was when people from a “good, upstanding home” were so 
polluted by lust and desire that they began to embody the moral degradation 
of society—a slippage difficult to return from. As Comstock preached: “Lust 
defiles the body, debauches the imagination, corrupts the mind, deadens the 
will, destroys the memory, sears the conscience, hardens the heart, and damns 
the soul. . . . Like a panorama, the imagination seems to keep this hated thing 
before the mind, until it wears its way deeper and deeper, plunging the victim 
into practices he loathes” (Brodie 1994, 416). Clearly, Comstock was focused 
not only on protecting society—and Christian families in particular—from 
debauchery, but also on protecting individuals from themselves. He did not 
merely fear evil men (or women) who seduced innocent persons, but he also 
depicted lust as affectively entering the bodies of the seducers and turning them 
into something/someone they were not. “The victim,” as Comstock wrote, 
was most often a young man or woman from a “good” middle-class home who 
became drawn in by more powerful forces to become the immoral debaucher he 
was never intended to be. And what Frauds Exposed made clear was that Com-
stock viewed abortion, or the possibility of abortion, as one of those dangerous 
moments: Once abortion was inflicted, the subject quite literally aborted her 
possibility of returning to the respectable positions of her birth. Thus, Com-
stock’s work was bent on preventing women from having access to abortion so 
that they could be protected and freed from being victims that acted against 
their own best interests.
Procreative behavior is socialized to interpellate reproducing subjects into 
an ethic of “responsibilization,” so that reproduction can be controlled through 
generating particularized knowledge about what constitutes responsible behav-
ior.10 This ideology is precisely what Comstock constructed to regulate sexuality 
and to tie it to a number of other “perverse” acts and discourses. By lobbying 
for laws that banned the distribution of obscene materials and the practice of 
abortion, because innocent women would then be protected, Comstock’s anti-
abortion measures not only outlawed abortion, but also discursively framed 
women as potential victims that needed discipline and security.
Comstock differed from Sanger in that he refused to allow for the pos-
sibility that women could be self-controlled citizens; for him, the ability to 
be responsible was tied to masculinity, which was why he only imagined how 
Sammis’s father felt after her death and why women like Woodhull and Restell 
were so threatening. In Comstock’s world, men must be disciplined so that 
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they can protect and rein in women. As Sally Shuttleworth (1990) writes about 
Victorian body politics:
Notions of gender differentiation fulfilled the ideological role of allowing 
the male sex to renew their faith in personal autonomy and control. Unlike 
women, men were not prey to the forces of the body, the unsteady oscillations 
of which mirrored the uncertain flux of social circulation; rather they were 
their own masters—not automatons or mindless parts of the social machinery 
but self-willed individuals, living incarnations of the rational individualists 
and self-made men of economic theory. (55)
This worldview aptly describes Comstock’s motivation to outlaw abor-
tion: While men should be self-willed, rational, and individualist, women are 
incapable of attaining these traits because of the more “natural” conditions of 
their bodies and therefore need to be given freedom from the harmful elements 
in society. Therefore, despite Comstock’s critiques of liberals, his ideologies 
are ultimately embedded in a liberal construction of the state and its societal 
structures that discipline citizens—albeit only male ones—to be self-controlling 
individuals. Yet, a key point to understanding Comtock’s investment in male 
autonomy is that the autonomous, self-willed man is also a classed construction 
that works to discipline middle-class men into seeing themselves according to 
class. Depicting men as autonomous and self-willed already imagines them as 
having a certain degree of disposable income or job security; when Comstock 
imagined the dismay Sammis’s father must have felt after learning about his 
daughter’s abortion, he appealed to a middle-class man who had the luxury of 
constructing a rational and individualist identity because of his class status.11
Comstock’s writings put forth that abortion, because it is both keenly tied 
to procreative behavior and presumably control, becomes a linchpin of respon-
sibilization. Anti-abortion laws function not only to prevent the practice, but to 
construct a knowledge about how subjects should behave according to certain 
gender norms—through what is defined as “responsible” behavior—as a means 
of disciplining and controlling the body-as-machine, the individual, and the 
demarcation of populations so as to deem which bodies and populations are 
“deserving” of responsibility and which need to be regulated and enclosed. In 
other words, law functions as judgment, but it also produces subjectivity. For 
Comstock, a society that allowed abortion was a society in demise, because it 
demonstrated men’s lack of control and women’s exposure to lustful forces: It 
both disallowed men the freedom to and it impeded women’s freedom from. 
However, more importantly, his texts became technologies of discipline through 
their distribution of knowledge about the supposed inherent evil of abortion, 
and their attempts to interpellate middle-class Americans into their disciplinary 
apparati.
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First Encounter: Final Thoughts
Sanger’s first encounter with Comstock occurred in 1913, after Sanger had 
published several columns in The Call, a popular New York socialist daily. Her 
column “What Every Girl Should Know” provided women with information 
on topics ranging from menstruation to masturbation and was one of the first 
explicit sex manuals for women written by a woman. Comstock banned its cir-
culation for several weeks, citing it for containing obscene material, although 
after relentless protests calling for First Amendment rights its publication was 
resumed (Chesler 1992, 66). Later, Comstock prosecuted Sanger’s husband, 
William, for distributing materials related to birth control; however, during the 
trial, Comstock fell ill with pneumonia and died eleven days later. In her autobi-
ography, Sanger attributed his death to William’s release from jail, writing that 
“[t]here was a terrific demonstration in Court which made the three judges turn 
pale & gave Comstock a shock from which he never recovered” (2003, 165). She 
wrote about his death and her husband’s acquittal with triumphant glee, which 
points to how strongly she perceived Comstock a major opponent in her fight to 
legalize birth control. And after all, her perception was not inaccurate, because 
the Comstock laws inscribed some of her major legal constraints. Yet, despite 
this apparent opposition, this article reveals that, in some ways, Comstock and 
Sanger depended upon a similar ideology.
Sanger’s and Comstock’s works, while seeming to profess conflicting politi-
cal paradigms, actually both share discourses based on individuated freedoms 
that work to manage bodies and populations. They were committed to out-
lawing abortion by employing two intertwined ideologies. First, they argued 
that middle-class values were a foundation for the betterment of the race. In 
Comstock’s logic, if abortion were outlawed, then (middle-class) families, and 
specifically daughters, would be protected and preserved; whereas in Sanger’s 
logic, if access to abortion were prohibited, then people would see the need 
for the “cleaner,” better-“controlled” form of birth control, which would also 
ultimately lead to a better human race. And second, both activists appealed 
to elements of a liberal discourse: Americans had the right to be protected, to 
monitor their homes, and to maintain their individualism. Neither asked about 
the rights of those that presented the threats, that contributed to an “unclean” 
America, and that destabilized the “house built on sand.”
This article covers a rather long span of time, from Comstock’s polemics 
beginning in the 1870s to Sanger’s politics in the 1920s and ’30s. Still, when 
their arguments are juxtaposed, similar principles emerge that reveal the limita-
tions of contemporary mainstream abortion politics both on the Right and Left. 
Abortion debates that are rooted in discourses of rights and individual liberties 
are inherently limited. The discourses of Comstock and Sanger—and the gaps 
in them—reveal how problematic it is to support abortion by using the rhetoric 
of rights and choice, which can so easily be argued in reverse.
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Wendy Brown (1995) presents one of the most compelling challenges to 
contemporary rights-based politics. She begins her speculation on the role of 
rights in U.S. politics by asking: “What is the emancipatory force of rights claims 
on behalf of politicized identities in late-twentieth-century North American 
political life?” (96). Brown is not interested in whether rights actually free 
subjects from repressive structures, but rather how rights work to shape those 
subjects into identity-based individuals, thus pointing to the impossibility of 
the universal claims that many rights-oriented arguments posit. As she astutely 
argues, in order to be persuasive, those arguments must provide the illusion that 
they are granting access based on a naturalized and universalized paradigm; 
however, it is precisely their ahistoricity that works to curtail their potential 
emancipatory force, because of the power these claims have to foreclose identity 
and refuse the recognition of those subjects outside its boundaries. Similarly, 
abortion rights maintained through legal provisions that grant either freedom 
from or freedom to always result in a granting of rights that is less than universal. 
Some populations can be excluded based on arguments that appeal to a lack 
of self-will, responsibility, or maturity, in much the same way that Comstock 
and Sanger attempted to free women from abortion for their own protection.
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Notes
1. I see the rhetorics of rights and choice as related, because they are both grounded 
in a liberal and individuated understanding of law: Both assume a universal, ahistoricized 
subject with no attention to particularities, which often make the access to rights or 
choice impossible or even more oppressive. There is a rich scholarship critiquing the 
legalization of abortion through rights and choice. See, for example, Drucilla Cornell’s 
The Imaginary Domain (1995) and Ricki Solinger’s Beggars and Choosers (2001) for a 
critique of choice, but a defense of rights; Rosalind Petchesky’s Abortion and Woman’s 
Choice (1990) for a critique of choice that avoids valorizing rights; and Mary Poovey’s 
“The Abortion Question and the Death of Man” (1992) for a critique of both rights 
and choice, which the argument made here follows most closely. I will argue here that 
Comstock’s positions, traditionally seen as conservative, contain components of liberal 
ideology, because they are invested in an individuated and self-controlled (male) subject.
2. Crenshaw begins her article, “Were the Critics Right About Rights? Reassessing 
the American Debate About Rights in the Post-Reform Era” (2000), by asserting that 
the era of civil rights is dead. She notes, for example, that whenever “civil rights” are 
invoked in legislation, the words often signal a reactionary attack on gains made during 
the civil rights era, such as affirmative action, thus demonstrating the slipperiness of 
rights language. In tracing the history of critiques of rights, Crenshaw identifies the 
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critics of rights as “Crits”—those that during the civil rights movement opposed the 
rights-based attempts to overcome U.S. racism.
3. In Roe v. Wade, the rhetoric of freedom to appears in Justice Blackmum’s opinion 
as follows: “This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the 
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy.” And freedom from: “We repeat, however, that the State does have an 
important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the preg-
nant woman, whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident who seeks medical 
consultation and treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate 
interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.”
4. The April 2007 Supreme Court case decision on abortion rights, in Gonzales 
v. Carhart, made this point even more explicit when Justice Kennedy argued that 
“partial-birth” abortion must be outlawed to protect women from making a harmful 
decision for themselves.
5. For example, a Google search for “Margaret Sanger” turns up Planned Parent-
hood sites praising their founder for work to make birth control accessible, as well as 
feminist organizations exalting Sanger as a role model for women, while also revealing 
sites that vilify her, accusing Sanger of racial genocide for her involvement in the U.S. 
eugenics movement.
6. Jensen (1981) acknowledges that her theory is speculative, since the eighth and 
ninth editions of Family Limitation are missing, which perhaps could have provided 
important clues regarding Sanger’s seemingly new position on abortion.
7. The editors of The Selected Papers of Margaret Sanger (Sanger 2006) include a 
different reading in their notes. They argue, “since MS never strongly reprimanded 
BCCRB [Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau] workers Marjorie Prevost and Anna 
Lifshiz for referring patients for abortions, her private views may not have changed 
much since 1914,” referring to Sanger’s earlier more lenient view of abortion. However, 
as I demonstrate here, almost all of her writing, including personal letters, suggest that 
she did view abortion as personally irresponsible behavior, even if she was occasionally 
forgiving of the circumstances that led women to seek the procedure.
8. Allowing women access to abortion if pregnancies presented health risks (physi-
cal or mental) gave rise to “therapeutic abortions,” which were legal in the United States 
until Roe v. Wade made all abortions legal.
9. The official title of the law is “An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and 
Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral Use.” Comstock objected to 
the colloquial reference to this law by his name. In Frauds Exposed ([1880]1969), he tries 
to show that he was not responsible for its passing, but that several members of Con-
gress strongly supported anti-obscenity laws and championed their passage. However, 
with the act’s passing into law, Comstock was made a special agent of the U.S. Postal 
Service, which inextricably associated him with its enforcement. These laws would not 
be federally overturned until the 1965 Supreme Court case Griswold v. Connecticut.
10. The concept of “responsibilization” comes from Michel Foucault’s The History 
of Sexuality (1990, 104–05). Foucault also adds that procreative behavior is socialized as 
one means to construct sexuality, which he writes should “not be thought of as a kind 
of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which 
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knowledge tries to gradually uncover” (105). In other words, there are no normative 
sexualities such as Comstock and Sanger wanted their audiences to believe; rather, they 
both constructed sexualities that fit into their political agendas, which were concerned 
with maintaining a hegemonic status quo.
11. My point here about how autonomous and self-willed men are a middle-class con-
struction is also reflected in Comstock’s temperance crusades during the late nineteenth 
century; see Nicola Beisel’s conclusion to Imperiled Innocents (1997), where she argues 
that temperance movements were based in preserving class divisions and maintaining 
a well-disciplined middle class.
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